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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this paper is to examine how dispute settlement  mechanisms in trade
agreements  have  evolved  and  to  discuss  the  implications  of differences  in  domestic
agricultural  policies  for  dispute  settlement  in  multilateral  as  well  as  regional  trade
agreements.
Agricultural Trade Disputes
The  Multilateral  Experience  There  is  no  question  that  fundamental  differences  in
agricultural  policy goals and instruments were at the heart of the agricultural trade disputes
which  permeated  the General  Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  throughout  its
existence.
The propensity of governments to treat agriculture  as a "special"  sector because of its
political sensitivities resulted in agriculture-specific  rules (Article XI:2(c)I),  special treatment
(grand-fathered  measures,  country  waivers,  refusing to ban  agricultural  export  subsidies
when  industrial export subsidies were banned)  and, ultimately,  lack of credibility  when it
became apparent that the rules were not effective  and did not apply equally to all.
The  lack of credibility  became  most  apparent when GATT members  began  in the
1980s to block the adoption of findings of the Subsidies and Countervailing Code which had
been negotiated  in the Tokyo Round.
With  the  benefit  of hindsight,  the  Tokyo  Round  Code provisions  that  applied  to
agricultural  export subsidies  illustrate  the danger  of negotiators  trying to draft  around a
problem.  The  rule  of law  cannot  be  built  on  a  foundation  of  "creative  ambiguity".
Consequently,  because  the  parties  did not  share  a  common  understanding  of what  the
provisions  were designed to accomplish,  GATT members started to block the adoption of
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The  general  provisions  of the  GATT  fared  much  better  than  the  Subsidies  and
Countervailing Code.  By and large, the dispute settlement system worked when basic issues
of non-discrimination  and nullification and  impairment were  at stake.  Probably the best
example of  the GATT overcoming  its inherent shortcomings  regarding agricultural trade was
the  Panel  finding  which  required  the  European  Community  (EC)  to modify  its  support
system for oilseeds which had been found to nullify duty-free bindings on oilseed  imports.
However, it is no coincidence that Europe accepted and implemented the Panel finding on
oilseeds only after it had come to the  conclusion that its relationship with the United States
and  the  rest of the world could  not  continue to  stand the  strain  of perpetual  anarchy  in
agricultural  trade.
The  recognition that multilateral trade  in  agricultural  products  must be based on  a
system of effective rules equally applicable to all was a necessary  condition for bringing the
Uruguay Round negotiations  on agriculture to  a successful conclusion.
Also contributing to the Uruguay Round breakthrough  on agriculture was the explicit
recognition  (missing  from  earlier  GATT  Rounds)  that  agricultural  trade  problems  stem
largely from differences  in domestic  agricultural policies,  particularly in the  level and type
of support.  The acceptance of the importance of these concepts  had been greatly facilitated
by  the  Producer  Subsidy  Equivalent  (PSE)  work  of the  Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation  and  Development (OECD) which had provided  governments for the first time
with  an  objective  means  to  make  country  and  commodity  comparisons  in  agricultural
support.
Probably the best example  of a GATT member consciously  deciding to narrow the
policy differences with  its most important trading partners was the  1992 decision of the EC
to  reduce  its internal  market  grain  prices  to  levels  much  closer  to world  levels  and  to
compensate producers  through direct income  supports tied to a system of acreage  set asides.
It should come  as  no  surprise  that  the practical  effect  of these  reforms was to make  the
European support system for grains more compatible  with that of the United States.
Complementing  a  set  of agricultural  trade  rules  and  commitments  which  were
perceived  as fair and effective was an improved system of dispute settlement.  Many trade
policy observers regard the new dispute settlement  system of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as the glue which is necessary to keep the organization  credible.
The decision to prevent parties to a dispute from blocking a Panel report; the decision
to make the dispute settlement more credible by establishing an Appellate Body review; and,
the decision to regard the Uruguay Round results as a single undertaking,  subject to common
membership  and a common dispute settlement system, have given the WTO the credibility
the GATT was sadly lacking in its last years.
Before  turning to  an  examination  of dispute settlement  in  a North American  Free
Trade Agreement  (NAFTA)  context,  it  is worthwhile  to recall  that  the WTO  system  of
dispute settlement evolved out of almost fifty years of GATT experience.  In the beginning,
the  major  emphasis  in the  GATT  was  to secure  a positive solution  to  a dispute  through
consultation and negotiation.  Thus, a solution mutually acceptable to the parties  to a dispute
was always  preferred to litigation.  However, if bilateral  or plurilateral discussions did not
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resolve the dispute  then the  objective  of the dispute  settlement  system was  to secure  the
withdrawal  of the measures  concerned  if the panel  or  Working  Party  found them to be
inconsistent  with the  GATT.  If the offending  member did  not  bring  its measures  into
conformity with the finding, the last resort of the GATT (and the WTO) was to provide for
compensation  or the  suspension of equivalent concessions  (retaliation)  on a discriminatory
basis,  subject to  the authorization  of the GATT members.  In  short, a major  goal of the
GATT was to ensure that a balance of interests, once established,  be maintained.
In  the  earlier  days  of the  GATT,  Working  Parties  comprised  of  government
representatives  were  often called upon to assist in dispute resolution.  With the benefit of
hindsight this was not  a very satisfactory  process  as  witnessed by the fact  that a  GATT
Working Party concluded in the mid-1970s that Canada could apply import quotas in support
of its  supply  management  system  for  eggs.  That Working  Party "win"  certainly  gave
Canadian policy makers the false  security that its system of Article XI import quotas was
fully consistent  with its  GATT obligations.  Fifteen  years later  a GATT panel  addressing
certain  Japanese  import  quotas  interpreted  Article  XI  in  a  much  more  restrictive  and
legalistic way than the Egg Working  Party.
Gradually, over the years, even the larger economic powers, such as the United States
and the EC, began  to  share  the views of the smaller  members that  a more  neutral,  more
codified,  more legalistic  approach  was required to manage  disputes  and avoid  conflicts.
Quiet diplomacy  and the old boy networks  were simply not sufficient,  nor were  Working
Parties.  However,  it took nearly five decades before the GATT dispute settlement system
acquired  the features  which  characterize  today's  WTO  and  NAFTA  dispute  settlement
procedures: the right to the establishment of a panel; rosters of experts to serve on panels in
their  personal  capacity  and  not  as  government  representatives;  the quasi-judicial  panel
process of written submissions, counter-submissions,  oral hearings and cross-examination
within the context of a legal framework of rights and obligations;  the establishment  of firm
time-lines governing the establishment  and operation of the panel; and the acceptance  that
a party to a dispute could not block the adoption of a report.
The NAFTA  Experience  One of the major differences  between the European  Union (a
customs  union)  and NAFTA  (a  free  trade  area)  is  that  the  former  is  predicated  on  the
progressive adoption of common  commercial policies.  Europe now has  common policies
governing virtually all economic activity including:  competition, technical regulations,  trade,
transport and agriculture.  However,  even a customs union with common policies requires
an effective  dispute settlement  mechanism.  Thus, the  Treaty of Rome  provides  that the
European Court of Justice "shall ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation
of this Treaty"  and that the judgements of the Court "shall" be executed by  the offending
member.
In contrast, WTO and NAFTA panel decisions are not self-enforcing.  However, once
a Panel decision is rendered the offending party must bring its measure  into conformity with
the treaty provisions or face compensation/retaliation.  This provides a healthy incentive to
respect the Panel finding.
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NAFTA  is not predicated on  common policies.  Instead  specific commitments  are
undertaken  and  it  is  presumed  that  members  will  make  the  domestic  policy  changes
necessary  to bring them into conformity with the trade agreement provisions.
Clearly, the domestic  policy adjustments required tend to be fairly modest for areas
where the level of support and  the marketing systems  are similar and the terms of market
access  are  reciprocal.  This is the case  for most Canada/U.S.  agricultural trade.  There are
notable  exceptions,  however,  and  they,  not surprisingly,  are  the  areas  where  friction  is
currently being experienced.  Dairy, poultry, grains, sugar and peanuts are all sectors which
are experiencing difficulties  because of real or perceived differences  in the level of support
and/or marketing systems  and/or asymmetrical terms of access.
Other speakers will deal with the specifics of these commodity sectors in more detail.
Suffice to say that the dispute settlement provisions of the NAFTA will continue  to be tested
wherever there is a perception that the trade playing-field is somehow tilted in favour of one
party at the expense of another.  However, there  are different  categories of irritants.  Some
(like  dairy,  poultry,  sugar)  are  examples  of irritation  that  the  NAFTA has  not  gone far
enough  in  reducing  barriers  to  trade.  Others  (like  potatoes,  grain,  cattle)  are  concerns
relating  to the  perception  that  NAFTA  has  gone  too  far  and  that  "unfair"  imports  are
triggering political pain thresholds.
The  solutions  to  these  two  categories  of irritants  are  obviously  not  the  same.
However, both types can put pressure on the dispute  settlement system.  The recent NAFTA
panel  on  Canadian  dairy, poultry,  egg, barley  and margarine  tariff equivalents  found that
Canada (and by extension the United States) can maintain tariff equivalents  on items which
were  identified  in our respective  WTO schedules.  In effect,  the Panel confirmed  that the
original  balance  of interests  in  agriculture  in  the  Canada/U.S.  Free  Trade  Agreement
included an agreement to maintain certain non-tariff barriers, recognizing that the Uruguay
Round was underway which could have implications  for their future.  Put another way, the
Panel concluded  that a deal is a deal, and if the parties wished to change the  deal it would
require a renegotiation.
It is interesting to note that the Panel on tariff equivalents was comprised of two U.S.
law professors chosen by Canada, two Canadian law professors chosen by the United States,
and  a  mutually  agreed  British  law  professor  acting  as  Chairman.  The  professional
composition  of this Panel  is  indicative  of how  legalistic  dispute  settlement  panels  have
become.  Political economy is out, law is  in!
This Panel is instructive in a number of ways.  It reflected  a basic difference of views
as to how WTO tariff equivalents should be interpreted  in the context of the NAFTA.  It was
preceded  by extensive  bilateral  negotiations which  lasted  for nearly  a year  before  it was
concluded that a negotiated  solution was not possible and that referral to a neutral panel of
experts was needed in order to determine  authoritatively  the legal rights  and obligations of
the parties.  The legal issue was not whether one party could maintain  a certain  support and
marketing  system, the issue was  what import measure could  be applied, given the  original
Canada/U.S.  deal on agriculture  and the  later WTO Agreements.
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A somewhat similar issue  is looming on sugar.  Here the question is whether or not
the  United  States  is  obligated  to  terminate  its  re-export  program  on  sugar  containing
products.  Unless there is a bilateral  solution, this case will eventually be placed before a
panel to determine the legal rights and obligations with respect to this measure.
More disturbing,  however,  are  the irritants which do  not reflect  differences  in the
interpretation of  the NAFTA, but rather reflect the politicization of an import issue and the
perception  that  "something"  should  be  done  to  limit  imports  because  a  political  pain
threshold has been reached.  The classic example  of this was the limit placed on imports of
wheat from Canada for a year in the fall of 1994.  To be blunt, the only reason Canada agreed
to this was under the threat of a more punitive Section 22 import quota.  However, today the
United  States no longer has the right to apply Section  22 import quotas  because it, like all
WTO members,  agreed to convert all existing non-tariff barriers  into tariff equivalents  and
not to reintroduce them.  This provision took effect on the entry into force of the WTO on
January  1, 1995.
Since Canada  and United States cannot apply import quotas against one another and
since "normal"  tariffs  are to be eliminated on all goods  (agricultural  and industrial) effective
January  1, 1998, the only ongoing import measures which can be applied on bilateral trade
under NAFTA are the "tariff equivalents" resulting from the WTO conversion of non-tariff
barriers.
Of course, neither  NAFTA nor the WTO prevent the  application  of anti-dumping,
countervail  or safeguard  measures.  However,  a party  wishing to invoke  a special import
measure must follow the international rules governing their application.
I mentioned earlier that there are two categories of irritants.  I could add two more by
drawing a distinction between problems which are being handled  on their technical  merits
in accordance with the letter of  the law and those which have become  so politicized that facts
have become almost irrelevant  and perceptions have become reality.  If an irritant reaches
this politicized  stage, it risks  undermining the acceptance  that bilateral  trade relations are
based on the rule of law.  The agricultural  experience of the GATT clearly illustrates that if
the  political  economy  of agriculture  is allowed  to  overwhelm the  law,  the  end result is
anarchy.
SUMMARY  AND  CONCLUSIONS
An effective,  rules based, dispute settlement system is an essential part of multilateral
and regional trade agreements.  The panel system which evolved in the GATT and which is
now incorporated  in the WTO and NAFTA provides  an objective way of resolving disputes
where bilateral  discussions have failed to reach a mutually  agreed resolution of differences.
Even in the best written trade agreements there is always  a potential for differences
in  interpretation  to emerge,  particularly  as time passes.  Parties  to a trade agreement  are
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constantly having to assess their international  rights and obligations when making changes
to domestic  laws and regulations.
Formal  litigation through the dispute settlement process should be, however, treated
as  a means  of last resort if the system is not to become  overloaded  and its quasi-judicial
character de-based.
In most cases,  it is much preferable for the parties to  a dispute to reach a bilateral
agreement  and it is even more preferable  that the parties and their constituencies take the
action necessary to minimize the need to involve the dispute settlement  machinery.
Lack  of knowledge  and  understanding  of each  party's  agricultural  support  and
marketing systems, lack of formal and informal consultations on an ongoing basis can lead
to  an  environment  where  small,  localized  irritants  can erupt  into  a major  trade relation
confrontation,  with unpredictable results.
While recourse to effective,  and impartial dispute settlement procedures may, in some
cases, be the only way of resolving particularly contentious issues, many potential disputes
can be settled without recourse to  litigation,  provided the governments  and the industries
concerned work hard at cultivating a genuine understanding and dialogue so that myths are
addressed  early before political rhetoric turns perceptions into reality.
The GATT experience clearly showed that most trade problems stem from differences
in the level  and types of support governments provide to their rural sectors.  The challenge
for a free trade area which does not have a common agricultural policy is to identify, control
and reduce the pressures which result from differences  in domestic agricultural policies.  This
can be done within the framework of a rules based trade agreement provided all stakeholders,
government  and industry, work hard to address legitimate concerns and grievances.  These
concerns  once  identified  should  be  promptly  dealt  with.  It  is unrealistic  and  counter-
productive  to  expect the dispute  settlement  system to handle every  irritant,  in particular,
those that  result  from  an inability  to  negotiate  a  solution  at the  time  an  agreement  was
negotiated.  The parties must do their part to resolve as many of their differences  as possible,
thus leaving litigation as the last resort.
This conclusion may appear to go somewhat against the grain to the extent it gives the
appearance  of harking  back  to the  earlier  days  of the  GATT  and  older  bilateral  trade
agreements  which  were  characterized  by  an  emphasis  on  consultative  mechanisms  and
negotiations  in order to manage disputes and avoid conflicts.  This is not what is intended.
Instead, what is being suggested is that a moder  trade agreement needs a rules based dispute
settlement  system  and  it  must  also have  mechanisms to  ensure  ongoing government-to-
government  and  industry-to-industry  dialogues.  In  short,  fostering  an  harmonious
agricultural trade relationship requires more than an effective  litigation mechanism.  It also
requires  a willingness  by governments and private sector interests  in all member countries
to  devote  sustained efforts  into making  trade  agreements  work effectively  by  managing
problems and resolving potential  conflicts before they become too entrenched.
Proceedings 36